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Construction contract administrators have no resource
available that helps them make correct decisions at the
field level regarding differing site conditions disputes.
Journal articles, papers and treatises review only a limited
number of cases, and often reach superficial or even
mistaken conclusions. The existing literature is too exact.
It addresses only specific issues and cannot be applied
generally to any issues that may arise in a differing site
conditions dispute. In fact, the existing literature may
promote contract disputes as much as prevent them.
This report is designed to provide contract
administrators with a document, based on case law, that can
be used in the field to help resolve any differing site
conditions dispute. It reveals the reasoning used by the
courts in reaching decisions on such disputes, and enables
contractors and owners to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of their positions and to decide whether to
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One of the most common disputes arising on construction
projects involves allegations of differing site conditions
(DSC) ; that is, a contractor asserting that the site
conditions encountered differed from what he was led to
believe existed.
A contractor will base his bid on representations of
the site made by the owner, on what he sees of the existing
conditions during a site visit, and on what he knows of the
local conditions from past experiences. Normally, this
amount of information is sufficient to allow a bidder to
accurately estimate the difficulty and cost of performing
the work; yet, during construction, a contractor may
encounter site conditions that were unanticipated and that
cause actual construction costs to exceed bid costs.
The facts and issues relevant to a DSC dispute will
vary from project to project. There is, however, a body of

2common law that is applicable to DSC disputes. Despite
factual differences, the common law principles used by
courts of law to resolve DSC disputes are consistent. In
theory, a set of rules, based on common law, can be
developed to predict the outcome of DSC disputes.
Background
The basic responsibility of an owner with respect to
the representation of existing site conditions is to make
available to all bidders all information in his possession
that is relevant to estimating the cost of the work. The
basic responsibility of a contractor is to avail himself of
all known information regarding the existing site conditions
and to make prudent judgments as to the effect the
information will have on the cost of performing the work.
When either party does not fulfill his obligation, a dispute
will likely arise. When it does, the contractor must assert




Figure 1 shows the avenues available to a contractor to
recover additional costs incurred as a result of differing
site conditions.
Two types of DSC claims can be asserted. The first
type seeks recovery from outside the limits of the contract
and is based on the legal theory of misrepresentation. The
second seeks recovery based on the language in the contract
via a concealed conditions or DSC clause.







TYPE I TYPE II
IMPLIED WARRANTY
Figure 1: Possible Avenues of Recovery

It is important to note that a misrepresentation claim
may be asserted even if the contract contains a DSC clause.
In most cases, however, the burden of proof is lighter,
recovery is easier through the DSC clause.
Misrepresentation
In the absence of a DSC clause, a contractor must seek
recovery under the theory of misrepresentation. Common law
holds that the positive representations made by an owner
regarding the nature of the work to be performed are
impliedly warranted to be correct. To recover under the
theory of misrepresentation, a contractor must prove that
the site conditions represented in the contract were not an
adequate depiction of the actual conditions encountered.
The misrepresentation theory also requires proof that the
owner's erroneous representations were misleading. Thus,
the contractor must show some fault on the part of the
owner
.
Misrepresentation is the only avenue of recovery if
there is no DSC clause in the contract, but recovery via a
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of proof required. Consequently, if there is no DSC clause
in the contract he is bidding on, a contractor will often
include in his bid a contingency amount to reduce the
financial risk of encountering the unknown. This practice
protects the contractor's interest but results in higher
bids to the owner.
Differing Site Conditions Clauses
To encourage lower bids, owners sometimes include a DSC
clause in their contracts. By including such a clause, the
owner assumes the financial risk of encountering changed
conditions at the site. In theory, owners are willing to
assume this risk to prevent bidders from including a
contingency in their bids. By promising to pay for any
added costs resulting from changed site conditions, an owner
induces lower bids. Only when more difficult conditions are
encountered will the owner pay the additional cost.
When properly administered, the DSC clause works to the
advantage of both the owner and the contractor. The owner
benefits by receiving lower bids on the original contract

6work, and the contractor benefits by not having to bear the
financial risk of encountering unforeseen conditions.
DSC clauses were first used by the federal government
in construction contracts in the late 1920s and have since
gained wide acceptance in both the public and private
sectors. The federal clause remains the model for DSC
clauses used in the public and private sectors. AIA 201-
1987 and EJCDC 1910-8 (1983) both include clauses that are
similar to the federal clause as do the standard contract
forms of many state departments of transportation. The
current version of the federal clause is reproduced below.
DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS
(a) The Contractor shall promptly, and before the
conditions are disturbed, give a written notice to
the Contracting Officer of (1) subsurface or
latent physical conditions at the site which
differ materially from those indicated in this
contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at
the site, of an unusual nature, which differ
materially from those ordinarily encountered and
generally recognized as inhering in work of the
character provided for in the contract.
(b) The Contracting Officer shall investigate the
site conditions promptly after receiving the
notice. If the conditions do materially so differ
and cause an increase or decrease in the
Contractor's cost of, or the time required for,
performing any part of the work under this
contract, whether or not changed as a result of
the conditions, an equitable adjustment shall be

made under this clause and the contract modified in
writing accordingly.
(c) No request by the Contractor for an equitable
adjustment to the contract under this clause shall
be allowed, unless the Contractor has given the
written notice required; provided, that the time
prescribed in (a) above for giving written notice
may be extended by the Contracting Officer.
(d) No request by the Contractor for an equitable
adjustment to the contract for differing site
conditions shall be allowed if made after final
payment under this contract. 1
The current federal clause recognizes two types of
differing site conditions as compensable. A Type I
condition occurs when a contractor encounters conditions
that differ materially from what the contract documents lead
him to believe exist. For example, if a contractor
discovers rock while excavating for a foundation and the
contract documents state that the soil is sand and clay, the
contractor should be entitled to the added costs of
excavating rock rather than sand and clay.
A Type II condition occurs when a contractor discovers
unusual conditions that do not normally occur in the type of
work required by the contract. For example, if a contractor
discovers large pieces of concrete in its excavation where
none is shown in the contract, the contractor should be
entitled to the additional costs for removing and hauling

8off the concrete pursuant to the differing site conditions
clause
.
Type I and Type II differing site conditions clauses
allow a contractor to recover for most situations that are
truly unforeseeable. They don't, however, allow a
contractor to recover for his own misinterpretation of
information provided by the owner. Many unsuccessful claims
pursued by contractors through the DSC clause are
unsuccessful because the contractor misinterpreted
information provided by the owner.
Objective
This paper provides contract administrators with a
document, based on case law, that can be used in the field
to help resolve any differing site conditions dispute. It
reveals the reasoning used by the courts in reaching
decisions on such disputes, and enables contractors and
owners to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their
positions and to better decide whether to settle an




Legal treatises, texts and articles on construction law
were reviewed to identify the issues that are relevant to
the resolution of DSC disputes. The cases cited in the
literature were compiled, reviewed and Shepardized. Court
opinions in these cases cited other DSC cases which were
also reviewed and Shepardized. Based on the decisions and
reasoning discovered in these cases, a flowchart was
developed that characterizes the rules of law applied by the
courts to DSC disputes.
Report Outline
The report is separated into four parts. Chapter 2
discusses instances of intentional misrepresentation.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 address unintentional misrepresentation:
concealment and implied warranty theories. Chapter 6
examines DSC disputes that arise on contracts containing a
differing site conditions clause. Finally, chapter 7 offers







Black's Law Dictionary defines misrepresentation as
Any manifestation by words or other conduct by one
person to another that, under the circumstances,
amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the
facts. An untrue statement of fact. An incorrect
or false representation. That which, if accepted,
leads the mind to an apprehension of a condition
other and different from that which exists. 2
The intent of the parties involved is irrelevant to
determining if a misrepresentation has occurred.
Misrepresentation can occur either intentionally or
unintentionally. In either case, a contractor may recover
This chapter discusses intentional misrepresentation.





Intentional misrepresentation is fraud and justifies
rescission of a contract. The case of Salinas v. Souza &
McCue Construction Co. (424 P. 2d 921) addresses this issue.
The contract was for the construction of a sewer line. Soil
borings taken at irregular intervals along the centerline
were included in the contract. Bidders were required to
"examine carefully the site of the work." During
construction Souza encountered unstable subsurface
conditions that would not support the sewer line. The
borings gave no indication that the soil would be unstable.
Souza sued to recover his additional costs.
During the trial, the court found that the city's chief
engineer was aware, from past experience, of the unstable
nature of the soil in the area of the sewer line. The
evidence suggested that he directed the city's soil testing
firm to take borings at intervals that would avoid the
unstable area. Based on this evidence, the court ruled that
the city intentionally misrepresented the subsurface
condition in order to induce lower bids. The fact that the
contract required a site visit was irrelevant to the
decision. The court allowed Souza to recover.
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It is the general rule that by failing to impart
its knowledge of difficulties to be encountered in
a project, the owner will be liable for
misrepresentation if the contractor is unable to
perform according to the contract provisions.
. .
.Even if the (site visit requirement) had
specifically directed the bidders to examine
subsoil conditions, which it did not, it is clear
that such general provisions can not excuse a




Proof of fraud is difficult because the contractor must
convince the court that the owner deliberately withheld,
altered, or misrepresented the existing conditions.
Specifically, a contractor must show that:
1. Information presented to bidders was incorrect or
was withheld altogether.
2. The information in question was relevant to
estimating the cost of the work.
3. Deliberate action or inaction on the part of the
owner caused information to be withheld or
incorrect information to be presented.
4. The owner was aware at bid time that the contract
contained incorrect information or omitted relevant
information
.
5. The contractor was damaged by the fraudulent act.

A contractor will almost always be allowed to recover
if relevant information is deliberately misrepresented Ln
the contract, and the contractor is misled and damaged by
this misrepresentation.
Summary
Fraud cases involving differing site condit ions
disputes are difficult to prove and rarely seen Ln
construction contracting. Five requirements were listed





As shown in Figure 1, under the theory of unintentional
misrepresentation, a contractor can pursue additional costs
incurred as a result of a differing site condition under two
legal concepts: concealment and implied warranty. This
chapter discusses unintentional concealment.
The Rule of Unintentional Concealment
To recover based on unintentional concealment, a
contractor must show that the owner failed to provide
bidders with information in the owner's possession that was
relevant to estimating the cost of the work. Where relevant
information is withheld and bidders are induced to submit
lower bids, the contractor is entitled to recover any added
costs that result from the withheld information.
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Information Withheld From Bidders
The case of Christie v. United States (237 U.S. 234)
illustrates the concealment rule. The contract was for the
construction of locks and dams on the Warrior River in
Alabama. Borings were included in the contract, and they
showed that the soil to be excavated was sand, gravel and
clay. During construction, Christie encountered stumps,
buried logs, and cemented sand and gravel during
construction. Christie sued to recover his added costs.
Evidence introduced at the trial showed that during the
boring operations, the drill crew encountered impenetrable
obstructions. When this occurred, the drill was simply
withdrawn from the hole and relocated until an area was
found where the drill could penetrate to the required
depths. The government's engineer did not see the value of
this information to bidders and omitted this fact from the
contract. The court found in favor of the contractor:
There could be only one conclusion from these
findings. There was a deceptive representation of
the material, and it misled. ...It makes no
difference to the legal aspects of the case that
the omissions from the records of the results of
the borings did not have sinister purpose. 4
In the case of United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co.
(253 U.S. 1), the court reached a similar conclusion. The
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contract called for dredging a portion of the Delaware
River. Borings were included in the contract that showed
that the material to be dredged was mud and sand. But
instead of mud and sand, Atlantic encountered compacted
sand, gravel and cobbles during the dredging.
Several months after the contract was awarded, Atlantic
learned that the government had encountered impenetrable
subsurface obstructions during the boring operation. The
field log of the drilling crew contained this information,
but the log was never provided to bidders. When Atlantic
did see this information, he concluded that impenetrable
obstructions would be encountered throughout the site and
that the dredging equipment being used was inadequate to
complete the work. Atlantic decided to subcontract the
remaining portion of the work and sued for his additional
costs. The court concluded:
The company did not know of the concealment of the
actual test of the borings, and the fact that it,
the company, attempted to struggle on against the
difficult conditions with its inefficient plant,
should not be charged against it. ...It did not
know at that time of the manner in which the "test
borings" had been made. Upon learning that they
had been made by the probe method, it then elected
to go no further with the work; that is, upon
discovering that the belief expressed was not
justified and was in fact a deception. And it was
not the less so because its impulse was not
sinister or fraudulent. 5
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These two decisions illustrate that the intent of the
owner is not relevant to a concealment case. Whether
information is withheld intentionally or unintentionally, a
contractor can recover if he can show that the information
withheld was relevant to estimating the cost of the work and
that he was damaged because relevant information was
withheld.
Is the Information Readily Available Elsewhere?
Many courts look beyond the contract documents before
concluding that relevant information in the owner's
possession was concealed. The central issue is the
availability of the information alleged to be concealed.
Information that is readily accessible from sources other
than the contract documents may deny recovery on a
concealment claim. Three cases illustrate this concept.
The first is Wiechmann Engineers v. State Department of
Public Works (107 Cal . Rptr. 529). The contract was for
road construction in Modoc County, California. The contract
included no information from the soil investigation that was
made along the route of the proposed road, but it did advise
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bidders that an investigation had been performed and that
the resulting report was available for bidders to review.
As required by the contract, Wiechmann' s vice president
made site visits prior to bidding the work, and, in fact,
traveled the entire length of the proposed road. During
these visits, the area was clear of snow, and boulders were
visible on the surface of the ground. Wiechmann bid the job
on the basis of the site investigation alone. He never
examined the soil report.
During construction, Wiechmann encountered subsurface
boulders that required larger excavation equipment than
planned. Wiechmann sued for his additional costs.
Wiechmann claimed that the presence of subsurface
boulders was known to the owner and was relevant to
estimating the cost of the work. Since there was no
representation in the contract documents that boulders would
be encountered, Wiechmann claimed that the owner concealed
this fact from bidders.
The court agreed that the owner did know that boulders
existed below the surface; the soil report showed boulders.
The court also agreed that there was no indication in the
bid documents that boulders would be encountered. The court
ruled, however, that because boulders were visible from a
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site visit, Wiechmann could not claim that the presence of
boulders had been concealed:
This is not a case in which it reasonably can be
contended the state had a duty to warn prospective
bidders of boulderous conditions, since the hazard
and risk of such a condition was readily apparent
as the result of an onsite inspection. ...Onsite
observations disclosed. . .that the work of
construction was to be undertaken in a boulderous
area and the degree and nature of the condition
would be something to consider when submitting a
bid. 6
A contractor cannot recover if the information claimed
to be concealed is readily accessible through sources other
than the contract documents. A bidder has a duty to avail
himself of all relevant information that is readily
accessible
.
But the courts are restrictive in the power they will
allow site visitation clauses to carry. These clauses will
be allowed to deny a contractor recovery only if the
condition that is claimed to be concealed is readily
observable from a site visit. In Wiechmann' s case, the
court hinted that if the boulders had not been easily
visible on the surface of the ground, Wiechmann may have
recovered.
Owners cannot hide behind the site visitation clause to
disclaim liability for facts that they truly conceal from
bidders. In Atlantic Dredging, the court was direct about
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when an owner cannot rely on a site visitation clause to
avoid paying additional costs:
The direction to contractors to visit the site and
inform themselves of the actual conditions of
a proposed undertaking will not relieve from
defects in the plans and specifications. 7
In Atlantic Dredging, the fact that the drill bit
encountered impenetrable obstructions was concealed from
bidders and could not be ascertained from a site visit.
Therefore, the site visitation clause could not be relied on
by the owner, and Atlantic Dredging recovered.
In C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc v. United States (89
Ct.Cl. 226), the court addressed the situation where site
information is provided outside the contract. This contract
was for the construction of a bridge substructure. No
boring logs were included in the contract, but bidders were
advised that a soil report and field logs were available for
review in the office of the contracting officer. Blakeslee
reviewed the soil report but not the field logs. The soil
report gave no indication that boulders existed on the site.
During construction Blakeslee encountered boulders.
Blakeslee learned after the contract was awarded that the
government had to blast boulders out of the way to complete
the wash borings shown in the soil report. Neither the fact
that the borings were obtained using the wash method nor the
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fact that blasting occurred during the boring operation was
revealed in the soil report Blakeslee read. Blakeslee
considered both of these facts to be relevant to bidding the
work, so he sued, claiming concealment.
The court found that although these facts were not
revealed in the soil report, they were clearly stated in the
field logs that Blakeslee failed to review. In denying
recovery, the court stated:
The method of making the borings and the fact that
dynamite was used and similar information is
recorded in the log book. Plaintiffs knew this
but made no effort to consult the log book, which
was available to them. Plaintiffs therefore have
no one but themselves to blame for the fact that
at the time they submitted their bid they did not
know that dynamite had been used by the defendant
in making the borings and can not be heard to
complain that they were misled or damaged by the
defendant because of that fact. 8
The courts will look beyond the representations made in
the contract documents before deciding that relevant
information has been concealed. Bidders have the duty to




A contractor cannot recover the additional costs
associated with encountering unforeseen difficulties simply
because they are unforeseen. The bench-mark case in this
instance is United States v. Spearin (248 U.S. 132) in which
the court ruled that a contractor "will not be excused or
become entitled to additional compensation because
unforeseen difficulties are encountered."
This rule of law was applied in the case of MacArthur
Bros. Co. v. United States (258 U.S. 6). The contract was
for dredging in connection with the construction of a new
canal. Part of the dredging was required by the contract to
be performed "in the dry, " which dictated the use of a
cofferdam. MacArthur devised what he believed to be a cost
effective method of constructing the cofferdam, where the
cofferdam sheeting would be butted up against an existing
pier. The pier, which had been recently built by the
government under a separate contract, would then become part
of the cofferdam. As it turned out, the new pier was not
watertight, and MacArthur' s cofferdam was not effective.
MacArthur incurred increased costs as a result.
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MacArthur sued, claiming that if the pier had been
properly constructed, it would have been watertight, and
since the pier's construction was improper, the requirement
that the work be performed "in the dry" could not be met.
MacArthur claimed that the government had a duty to inform
him that the pier could not be effectively used as a part of
a cofferdam.
The court ruled in favor of the government. There was
no evidence presented that the government knew that the new
pier was not watertight nor that the government knew of any
existing conditions that would impede performance of work
"in the dry." The court's opinion was unequivocal:
There was indication of the manner of performance,
but there was no knowledge of impediments to
performance, no misrepresentation of the
conditions, exaggeration of them, nor concealment
of them; nor, indeed, knowledge of them. To hold
the government liable under such circumstances
would make it insurer of the uniformity of all
work, and cast upon it responsibility for all of
the conditions which a contractor might encounter,
and make the cost of its projects always an
unknown quantity. 9
The fact that the pier was not watertight was not
necessarily relevant to completing the work. The government
did not require the existing pier be used in the cofferdam
design. Presumably, if the government had directed that the
pier be incorporated into the cofferdam design or if
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MacArthur's design was the only design possible, the
government would have been obligated to warn bidders that
the pier was not watertight. That was not the case.
MacArthur could have designed a cofferdam that avoided using
the existing pier.
Summary
By claiming concealment, a contractor asserts that the
owner did not honor his obligation to present to bidders all
site information he had in his possession at bid time. To
recover under a theory of concealment, a contractor must
prove that
:
1. The owner had information on the existing site
condition at bid time that was not made available
to bidders.
2. The withheld information was necessarily relevant
to estimating the cost of the work.
3. The withheld information was not readily available




The contractor was damaged by the fact that




IMPLIED WARRANTY: POSITIVE REPRESENTATION
In claiming concealment, a contractor argues that the
owner didn't tell him everything he knew, but in claiming a
breach of implied warranty, a contractor argues that what
the owner told him was wrong. To recover on an implied
warranty theory, a contractor must show that information
presented in the bid documents as factual was incorrect.
The Rule of Implied Warranty
Courts generally rule that factual statements made in
the bid documents imply a warranty to bidders that the
statements are correct. The rule of law regarding recovery
under a theory of implied warranty is well established:
The general rule may be deduced from the decisions
that where plans or specifications lead a public
contractor reasonably to believe that conditions
indicated therein exist, and may be relied upon in
making his bid, he will be entitled to
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compensation for extra work or expense made
necessary by conditions being other than as so
represented. 10
The implied warranty rule is prevalent throughout the
case law involving differing site conditions disputes.
Crucial to decisions relying on this rule is the




A positive representation is any factual statement made
in the contract. The owner is liable for the accuracy of
the facts he presents. Conversely, bidders are responsible




The case of Elkan v. Sebastian Bridge District (291 F
532) highlights the difference between facts and
assumptions. The contract was for the construction of a
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bridge. The plans contained soil borings, but the borings
were not taken at locations where Elkan's excavation was to
be done; the borings were taken in locations near, but
outside, the area of excavation. The specifications stated:
"Borings have been made at the bridge site, and the findings
are as indicated on sheet No. 2."
The soil encountered by Elkan during excavation
differed from that shown by the borings on sheet No . 2 of the
contract plans. The difference between the actual condition
and the represented condition caused Elkan additional
expense, so he sued to recover these costs.
The court recognized that soil borings represent the
subsurface condition only at the hole. Elkan's excavations
were not made in the same locations as the borings. The
court concluded:
Of course, any one would realize that the actual
sub-soil conditions might, except where and to the
depth shown by the borings, be different than so
shown. The actual conditions were hidden. The
borings were merely indications, at certain places
and to certain depths, from which deductions might
be drawn as to actual conditions along the line
and to the depths of such borings. Both parties
knew that deductions so drawn might prove untrue
when the necessary excavations were made. 11
The court determined that the borings shown in the
plans accurately depicted what the owner knew of the
existing subsurface condition, and that Elkan assumed that
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those conditions would be encountered during excavation.
That assumption was made at Elkan's own risk.
The mistake of these two appellants is in
interpreting the facts to mean that the district
stated that the sub-soil conditions which would be
encountered by the contractor were such as were
shown by the boring sheets. The district made no
such statement. It stated that the boring sheets
showed truly what had been found by the borings.
That statement was true. 12
The borings themselves are factual and are generally
ruled to impliedly warrant the condition at the hole.
Assumptions made of the subsurface condition between the
holes is made at the contractor's risk.
Risk of Assumptions
Wunderlich v. State of California (423 P. 2d 545) was
also the result of an incorrect assumption made by the
contractor. This was a highway construction contract that
involved both cuts and fills. In reference to a hillside
adjacent to the work that was available as a source of fill
material, the state provided bidders with subsurface test
reports and an inter-departmental memo:
The hillside is composed of rather loosely
compacted sand and gravel ranging from 4 inches to
dust. A layer of blow sand covers the base of the
hill and apparently exists in spots on the slope
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as some test holes encountered considerable coarse
material while others were practically all sand.
Tests indicate that after processing, to meet the
grading requirements, the material is suitable for
imported base material...
This source is well located as far as economy of
hauling is concerned considering a single source
of material for the entire length of the project.
With this in mind, a borrow agreement was
negotiated with the property owners by the Right
of Way Department for the material on the
hillside. . . 13
Relying on this memo, Wunderlich bid the job to use the
hillside as the sole source of fill material. Once
construction began, the company discovered that the hillside
contained too much sand to produce a sufficient quantity of
acceptable fill. When Wunderlich was forced to import
material from farther off site, he sued to recover his
additional costs.
At trial, Wunderlich claimed that the test report and
memo provided by the state were positive representations
that the hillside would produce a sufficient quantity of
fill material to complete the job.
The court ruled that neither the test report nor the
memo constituted a positive representation that the hillside
would produce a sufficient quantity of fill. The court did
agree that the memo made a positive assertion that the
hillside would produce sufficient fill, but it ruled that
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this assertion was reasonably based on the information
provided in the test reports. Since the same test reports
were also made available to Wunderlich, the court ruled that
Wunderlich was free to accept or reject the state's
conclusion
.
This ruling allows owners to make statements that are
intended to help bidders without being liable for the
statements if the owner also provides the data he used to
reach his conclusions:
If statements "honestly made" may be considered as
"suggestive only, " expenses caused by unforeseen
conditions will be placed on the contractor. 14
The court found that the state's memo reached a
reasonable conclusion from the information provided by the
test report. The state's conclusion was "honestly made."
Because the data used by the state was also given to
Wunderlich, the court ruled that the state's memo was
"suggestive only, " and that Wunderlich was free to draw its
own conclusions from that data.
Although the state made a positive representation of
the material content of the hill, Wunderlich was not
justified in relying on the state's conclusion. He was
obligated to draw his own conclusions from the test report.
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The Elkan and Wunderlich decisions illustrate the
difficulty of proving that a contract contains a positive
representation. From these cases, one can conclude that a
"positive representation" is simply what is presented by the
bid documents as a fact. Any assumption made by a bidder is
made at his own risk. The owner will be held liable only
for the accuracy of the facts he presents.
Summary
A positive representation is any statement represented
by the contract to be a fact. Factual statements imply a
warranty to bidders that the statements are correct. The
owner is liable for the facts presented in the contract, but





IMPLIED WARRANTY: JUSTIFIED RELIANCE
If a positive representation can be shown, the
contractor must then convince the court that he was
justified in relying on that representation when preparing
his bid. Deciding when a bidder is justified in relying on
a representation in the contract is difficult. The language
in the contract is of paramount importance to the decision.
The court, in Wunderlich, specifically addressed the issue
of "justified reliance":
Although there is some evidence that plaintiffs
"relied" on the alleged representations as to the
character of the [hillside], the question is
whether, under the circumstances of the indefinite
nature of the statements .. .the bidder could
justifiably rely on the statements. It does not
appear that plaintiffs could have done so, and the
state is not responsible for the subjective
interpretation placed upon the information by
bidders. 15
Here, the court pointed to the "indefinite nature" of
the statements made in the memo as being sufficient to
preclude reliance on them. In the memo, the state provided

33
Wunderlich conclusions, not facts. The factual information
was the soil report. Because the soil report was made
available to bidders, they were not justified in relying on
the state's conclusions. They were obligated to drawn their
own. Presumably, if the state had provided the memo without
the backup data, Wunderlich would have been justified in
relying on the state's conclusions as factual.
The case of Hollerbach v. United States (233 U.S. 165)
also addressed the issue of "justified reliance." The
government contracted with Hollerbach for repairs to an
earth dam. The repairs required the existing backing
material to be removed and replaced. The contract documents
told bidders that the dam was backed with broken stone,
sawdust and sediment. During construction, Hollerbach
discovered that the dam was actually backed entirely with
soft, slushy sediment which made its excavation and removal
costlier
.
Hollerbach sued for his increased costs on the basis
that the contract stated specifically what the dam was
backed with; that this statement was factual and constituted
a positive representation of the type of material to be
removed; and that, because it was factual, he was justified
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in relying on it in estimating the cost of the work. The
court agreed with Hollerbach:
If the government wished to leave the matter open
to the independent investigation of the claimants,
it might easily have omitted the specification as
to the character of the filling back of the dam.
In its positive assertion of the nature of this
much of the work it made a representation upon
which the claimants had a right to rely without an
investigation to prove its falsity. 16
The courts have held repeatedly that bidders are
justified in relying on all factual information presented by
the contract documents. As was seen in Wunderlich, this
rule is not extended to conclusions drawn by owners from
data that is also made available to bidders. Bidders are
required to draw their own conclusions.
Allowing bidders to rely on factual information has
placed a burden on owners to insure the accuracy of the
facts presented in their contracts. In an attempt to avoid
this burden, owners have resorted to using exculpatory
language in their contracts to disclaim liability for the
facts presented.
Exculpatory Language
Exculpatory language warns bidders not to rely on the
site information provided by the owner. An owner obtains
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site information for design purposes, not for the purpose of
estimating construction costs. Consequently, site
information obtained by the owner may be adequate to design
the project but inadequate to estimate construction costs.
Because they do not want to be liable for construction cost
overruns resulting from a bidder's reliance on design data,
many owners include language in their contracts that
disavows liability for the site information provided.
The court, in Robert E. McKee, Inc. v. City of Atlanta
(414 F.Supp. 957), best summarized the effect of exculpatory
clauses on misrepresentation claims:
State courts .. .have imposed two implied conditions
on a claim for recovery for misinformation. The
first requirement is that the bidder is not
reasonably able to discover the true facts for
himself. ...Thus, the first question that must be
asked in each contract case involving
misrepresentation is whether the contractor could
have discovered the true facts through reasonable
investigation. In determining whether such
investigation should have been done the court
should consider the time constraints involved, the
cost of the investigation in comparison to the
total bid price, and the detailed nature of the
government's data. If the court finds that it
would be unrealistic to expect bidders to uncover
the error on their own, then the exculpatory
clauses should be given no effect
.
The second condition placed on a claim for
recovery for misrepresentation is the materiality
of the misrepresentation itself. Recovery cannot
be had for a contractor's own mis judgment based on
information which itself is accurate. ...When the
contractor has the actual, and accurate,
statistics before him when he makes his bid, he

36
assumes the risk of any deviation in conditions
from those indicated by the samples. In other
words, if the government does not provide
incorrect factual representations, the exculpatory
clauses in the contract placing the burden of
uncertainty on the contractor should be given full
force and effect. 17
Positive Versus Informational Representations
Courts distinguish between "positive representations"
and "informational representations." A positive
representation is presented as a fact on which a bidder is
expected to base his bid. An informational representation
is presented "gratuitously" and is intended only to assist a
bidder in formulating his bid.
In general, exculpatory language will not prevail over
positive representations, but will prevail over
informational representations. The case of Sasso v. New
Jersey (414 A. 2d 603) illustrates the judicial attitude
toward exculpatory language and "informational
representations .
"
The case resulted from a road construction contract in
New Jersey. The contractor contended that he based his bid
on a cross-section in the plans showing the existing asphalt
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to be 2" thick. The actual thickness of the pavement
averaged 3.5". The state claimed that the cross-section
used by Sasso was included in the contract only to help
visualize the existing construction and was not intended as
an as-built depiction of the existing pavement. The state
pointed to language in the specification requiring bidders
to make their own investigations of the subsurface
conditions and disclaiming any responsibility for subsurface
information that bidders might obtain from the owner.
The trial court found that the cross-section
constituted a positive representation and would not allow
the exculpatory clause to prevail. This decision was
reversed by the appeals court:
While we might agree with the trial judge that
"general exculpatory clauses" will not relieve the
State from responsibility for its express
representation, it is otherwise where the relevant
language of the contract is so straightforward,
unambiguous and categorical as this is in placing
responsibility for subsurface investigations on
the contractor. ...The exculpatory provisions
focus directly on subsurface conditions and
require the bidder to make its own investigations.
...Under the terms of this contract, the State's
representations are merely gratuitous and if
plaintiff chose to rely on this information it
acted at its peril. To conclude otherwise would





Owners often rely on a site inspection clause to try to
deny liability for the site information they provide
bidders. A typical site inspection clause requires bidders
to visit the site and become familiar with the local
conditions before submitting a bid. The case of Pinkerton
and Laws Co., Inc. v. Roadway Express, Inc. (650 F.Supp.
1151) addresses the role of a site inspection clause in
differing site conditions disputes.
The contract was for the construction of a freight
terminal. The plans included soil borings and a site
visitation clause that required each bidder to make a site
inspection before submitting the bid. P&L did make a site
visit
.
The specifications required compaction to 95% Modified
Proctor but contained no information on the natural moisture
content of the existing soil. P&L assumed that the existing
soil could be compacted to meet the specification
requirements and based his bid on this assumption. After
award, P&L discovered that the existing soil could not be
compacted to 95% Modified Proctor without being dried first.
P&L dried and used the existing soil, but this unanticipated
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work caused actual costs to exceed bid costs. P&L sued to
recover the additional costs.
The court found that P&L was not entitled, under the
contract, to recover these costs. The court pointed to the
site inspection clause:
Such site inspection clauses impose upon
contractors—particularly experienced ones like
P&L--a duty to exercise professional skill in
inspecting the site and estimating the cost of the
work. ...When the contract contains no changed
conditions clause and imposes a site inspection
requirement on the contract, the risk of
uncertainty of subsurface conditions is placed on
the contractor. 19
The court went on to say that this pronouncement could
be avoided if the contractor could show that the plans and
specifications were implied warranted. In this case, the
court did not find an implied warranty:
The court can find no positive assertion or
representation by Roadway regarding soil
conditions that allegedly proved to be incorrect.
Indeed, the contract contains no express
representations regarding the presence or absence
of excess moisture or poor drainage. ...Roadway
made no representation that these boring logs
provided all information needed by bidders when
estimating the cost of excavation and compaction,
or even that the logs were correct. Instead, the
contract documents directed the contractor to
examine the site to ascertain the conditions
therein. 20
If a contract is silent as to a particular condition,
it is impossible to recover additional costs by claiming
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"implied warranty" of the plans and specs. To convince a
court that contract representations are impliedly warranted,
a contractor must first show that there is a representation
in the contract. Since P&L's contract made no
representation regarding the natural moisture content of the
existing soil, the court found that P&L had no recourse from
within the contract to recover his additional costs.
Information Provided Outside the Contract
Courts often find that soil borings constitute a
positive representation and are, therefore, impliedly
warranted. In response many owners purposely to exclude
soil borings and other site information from the contract.
Still, owners are required to reveal all information in
their possession that is relevant to bidding the work.
Consequently, owners who do purposely exclude site
information from their contracts, often provide the
information to bidders outside the contract, usually with a
disclaimer for its accuracy.
The courts distinguish between information made
available in the contract and information made available
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outside the contract. In A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State
of California (48 Cal.Rptr. 225), the court observed:
If the contracting agency furnishes inaccurate
project information, such as soil reports, as a
basis for bids , it may be liable for damages on a
breach of warranty theory. ...If the agency makes
geological data available under a disclaimer of
responsibility, the contractor bears any loss
occasioned by unexpected conditions. ...The
contracting agency's disclaimer does not protect
it from liability for deliberate misrepresentation
or concealment. 21
In the case of S&M Constructors, Inc. v. City of
Columbus (434 N.E.2d 1349), the city excluded soil survey
information from the contract but made it available to
bidders upon written request. The bid documents contained
the following disclaimer:
Test borings have been made at several locations
along the line of the work involved under the
Contract. Copies of the soil report... are
available on request. ...Said borings, test
excavations and other subsurface investigations,
if any, are incomplete, are not a part of the
contract documents, and are not warranted to show
the actual subsurface conditions. 22
S&M obtained a copy of the soil report and based his
excavation bid on that information. S&M encountered
subsurface conditions that were not indicated in the soil
report and which made excavation more costly than




Relying on both Elkan and Wunderlich, the court ruled
that the soil reports that the city provided upon request
"did not misrepresent the conditions. They were accurate as
far as they went." In the absence of fraud or bad faith,
the court ruled that the exculpatory language could prevail.
It was clear and unambiguous, and therefore, enforceable.
S&M could not recover his additional costs.
Another court reached a similar conclusion with similar
facts. The case of Joseph F. Trionfo and Sons. v. Board of
Education (395 A. 2d 1207) arose from a contract for the
construction of a school. The contract contained the
following paragraph:
Bidders shall make their own investigation of
existing subsurface conditions; neither Owner or
Architect will be responsible in any way for
additional compensation for excavation work
performed under the Contract due to Contractor's
assumptions based on sub-soil data prepared solely
for Architect's use. 23
The bid documents stated that a soil investigation had
been performed, but no information from that investigation
was included in the bid documents. The soil investigation
was made available to bidders, but only upon a written
request in the following form:
Please forward copies of test boring data sheets
for the subject project. The contracting firm
herein named releases the Owner and Architect from
any responsibility or obligation as to its
accuracy or completeness or for any additional
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compensation for work performed under the contract
due to assumptions based on use of such furnished
information , 24
When Trionfo encountered a substantial quantity of
rock, he sued to recover the additional costs. The court
found that the combination of the exculpatory language and
the written release made it clear that bidders were not
justified in relying on the soil information provided.
As in any case based on a theory of
misrepresentation, in order to recover, appellant
must establish a right to rely on the information
furnished by the owner. We hold as a matter of
law that under the circumstances of this case no
such reliance was warranted. ...To hold under
these circumstances that appellant is entitled to
recover would be to hold that the owner furnishing
test results merely as an accommodation to bidders
is an insurer of their accuracy and would require
us to ignore the explicit language in the contract
documents and in the release executed by appellant
as a prerequisite to obtaining the test boring
data."
Contractors are in a particularly difficult situation
when soil information is made available to them only outside
the contract. First, making information available outside
the contract makes it easier for owners to disclaim
liability for the information. Second, if a bidder is made
aware that additional site information exists, he will be
held responsible for that additional information even if he
does not examine it. A bidder cannot ignore site
information he knows exists outside the contract.
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Bidder's Obligation to Review All Information
The case of Flippin Materials Co. v. United States (312
F.2d 408) addressed the issue of a bidder's obligation to
review information provided outside the contract. Flippin
contracted to provide aggregate material to the government
for use on a concurrent project. The government provided
Flippin the site from which the material was to be
excavated. The bid documents included soil borings and made
bidders aware that the complete soil report was available at
the government's field office. Flippin did not obtain the
complete soil report but based his bid exclusively on the
information contained in the bid documents.
During excavation, Flippin discovered cavities in the
source material that contained clay deposits. The borings
in the contract documents did not show the existence of clay
in the rock cavities, but the field logs, which Flippin
failed to examine, did. The presence of clay made the
excavation and crushing process more expensive. Flippin
sued for his additional costs.
Relying on Hollerbach, Flippin claimed that the borings
shown in the plans constituted a positive representation of
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the subsurface condition, and that he was not responsible
for researching the accuracy of a positive representation.
The court agreed that a contractor can rely on positive
representations made in the contract documents without
researching their accuracy, but ruled that Flippin could not
ignore the subsurface information in the complete soil
report that he was made aware of by the contract:
The cases do not hold that a bidder can rely on
some portion of the information supplied by the
Government without looking at other Government
materials (to which he is directed by the contract
documents themselves) which qualify, expand, or
explain the particular segment of information on
which the contractor intends to rely.
...The fair residue of the opinions is that a
contractor cannot call himself misled unless he
has consulted the relevant Government information
to which he is directed by the contract,
specifications, and invitation to bid. As we read
them, the decisions of the Supreme Court and of
this court do not permit the contractor to rest
content with the materials physically furnished to
him; he must also refer to other materials which
are available and about which he is told by the
contract documents. 26
Proof of Damages
A contractor who has successfully proven that his
contract contained a positive representation on which he was
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justified in relying must then show that he was damaged and
quantify the damages. This entails proving that:
1. He did rely on the positive representation when
formulating his bid and was misled by the
erroneous representation in the contract.
2. The condition encountered differed from the
positive representation in the contract.
3. The differing conditions resulted in damages that
can be reasonably determined.
Actual reliance is often based on an examination of
actual bid sheets and other records. Expert testimony can
be used to convince a court that the actual site conditions
differed from the conditions represented by contract.
Proving damages consists of showing the court how much
additional money was spent performing the work as a result
of the misrepresentation. Accounting documents are often
used. A thorough discussion of proof of damages is outside





The assertion made by a contractor under a theory of
implied warranty is that information presented to him by the
owner was wrong. To recover under the theory of implied
warranty, a contractor must convince a court that:
1. The contract contained a positive representation
of the existing site condition.
2. The contractor was justified in relying on the
positive representation made in the contract.
3. The contractor based his bid on the contract's
positive representation.
4. The contractor was misled by the contract's
positive representation.
5. The contractor was damaged by the
misrepresentation
.
Synopses of Implied Warranty Claims
Figure 2 shows a flowchart of the recovery process for
a DSC claim based on unintentional misrepresentation. It
can be used to quickly assess the chances of recovery on any
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claim (concealment or implied warranty) being pursued under
the theory of unintentional misrepresentation. Included
below are synopses of DSC claims pursued under a theory of
unintentional representation. The issues presented in these
cases, along with the discussion in the first three chapters
of this report, will help create an understanding of when
the courts will allow recovery.
In Cruz Construction v. Lancaster Area Sewer Authority
(439 F.Supp. 1202), a sewer contractor encountered rock at a
higher elevation than the borings showed. While the
contract estimated 8050 cy of rock would have to be removed,
Cruz actually removed over 27,000 cy . Cruz sought an
increase to his unit price because of the significantly
larger volume of rock. The court ruled that Cruz was not
justified in relying on the borings because of exculpatory
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Figure 2: Unintentional Misrepresentation Flowchart
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In Acchione and Canuso v. Commonwealth of PA. Dept of
Transportation (461 A. 2nd 765), the contractor's take-off of
linear feet of trenching on a highway improvement project
was significantly higher than the trenching estimate givenin
the contract. The contractor called the designer who told
him to assume that 50% of the existing utilities were in
conduits that could be reused and would not require
retrenching. Acchione and Canuso accepted this information
and used it in formulating their bid. During construction,
they found that most of the existing conduit could not be
reused, and they were forced to do more trenching than they
bid on. The court ruled in favor of the contractor claiming
that the information provided by the designer was "uniquely
in the purview of the owner, " so the contractor was
justified in his reliance on it.
In Morrison-Knudsen v. State of Alaska (519 P. 2nd 834),
the state provided sites from which construction materials
could be dredged to use in the construction of an airport.
One bidder visited the potential dredge site and concluded
that it would not produce enough suitable material. The
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bidder informed the state of his conclusion. The contract
was awarded to another bidder, Morrison-Knudsen . During
construction, M-K could not get enough material from the
dredge site. When they found out that the other bidder had
warned the state of this prior to bid opening, M-K sued,
claiming that the state had an obligation to reveal this
information to all bidders. The court ruled in favor of the
state since the information was only the opinion of a bidder
and was not information that was acquired with special
technical assistance supplied by the state.
* * *
In United States v. Gibbons (109 U.S. 200), the
contractor was to rebuild a facility destroyed by fire. A
portion of the foundation of the destroyed building remained
and was to be built upon on this contract. Gibbons visited
the site prior to bid to see how much of the old foundation
remained and to determine the scope of new work. During
construction the owner discovered that not all of the
foundation that remained was stable and directed Gibbons to
remove more of the old foundation. Gibbons sued for the
added costs of rebuilding more of the foundation than he
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anticipated. The court ruled in favor of Gibbons claiming
that the portion of the foundation that existed at the time
Gibbons made his site visit was a positive representation of
the existing site condition on which Gibbons was justified
in relying.
* * *
Foundation Co. v. State of New York (135 N.E.236)
involved a contract for the construction of a dam. The dam
was to have a caisson foundation, and the caissons were
shown in the contract to rest on bedrock. Borings were
made, but they were not a part of the contract. There was
no indication anywhere in the contract of the elevation of
bedrock at the site. Foundation asked to review the state's
borings which showed bedrock no lower that elevation 148.
During construction, Foundation had to drill several
caissons significantly lower than elevation 148 before it
encountered bedrock. Foundation sued for these additional
costs. The court ruled in favor of the state claiming that
borings provided outside a contract are not impliedly
warranted, and any assumptions made from this information




In George F. Pawling Co. v. United States (62 Ct.Cl.
128) the contractor incurred additional costs as a result of
blowouts in his cofferdam. The contract contained no soil
borings but did require bidders to make a site visit and
discover the nature of the existing conditions for
themselves. The court concluded that the blowouts were the
result of the nature of the soil under the cofferdam. Since
the contract made no representation of this soil, the owner




In Mandel v. United States (424 F.2nd 1252), the
contractor encountered water at less than three feet below
grade. The borings included in the contract showed that
water was no higher than eight feet below grade. The higher
water table caused Mandel additional drainage costs. The
court found that the government concealed no information.
It had no knowledge that the water table would be found
higher than eight feet below grade. The court also ruled
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that the contract did not warrant, either impliedly or
expressly, that water would not be found higher than eight
feet below grade; it merely represented what was found in




In Cook v. Oklahoma Board of Public Affairs (736 P. 2d
140), the court was asked to rule between an owner's
concealment and a contractor's inadequate site inspection.
The contract for renovations to a fish hatchery included 50
soil borings. None of the borings showed the presence of
water despite an engineering report in the owner's
possession showing an underground aquifer running through
the project site. Contractors were required to make a site
visit; Cook did not. Cook based his bid on the borings, and
when he encountered water in his excavations, sued to
recover his additional costs. Evidence showed that even a
cursory pre-bid site investigation would have revealed mud
and surface water on the site. The court ruled that the
aquifer's presence was not truly concealed since its





DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS CLAUSES
The current federal DSC clause and the current AIA and
EJCDC clauses all recognize as compensable, two types of
differing site conditions. Type I is defined in the federal
clause as "subsurface or latent physical conditions at the
site which differ materially from those indicated" in the
contract. Type II differing site conditions are defined as
"unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual
nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily
encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of
the character provided for in the contract."
DSC Claims Distinguished from Misrepresentation Claims
As shown in Figure 1, a contract containing a DSC
clause gives a contractor an alternative to a
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misrepresentation claim to recover unexpected costs
resulting from differing site conditions. A DSC clause
gives a contractor access through the contract to recover
additional costs when differing site conditions are
encountered. The clause does not guarantee the accuracy of
the information presented in the contract documents, but it
does promise that a contractor will receive an equitable
adjustment if one is warranted.
With a DSC clause, a contractor does not have to prove
that the owner misrepresented the existing site conditions.
He only needs to show that the conditions encountered were
different from what he expected.
The courts have been quick to distinguish between
claims based on misrepresentation and claims based on the
DSC clause:
In misrepresentation, the wrong consists of
misleading the contractor by a knowingly or
negligently untrue representation of fact or a
failure to disclose where a duty requires
disclosure. ...The claim based upon the modern
changed conditions clause is very much different,
though it may arise from the same facts and be
joined with a claim for misrepresentation.
Misrepresentation is not the issue. ...A finding
that the contractor was actively "misled," in the
sense that the Government "withheld" or
"concealed" information within its grasp, is not
essential to proof of a changed condition.
. . .Fault on the part of the Government is not a
necessary element. ...A changed conditions claim,
so far as the contract is concerned, is entirely
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dependent on what is "indicated" in the contents
of the contract documents. ...The causes of an
erroneous indication in the contract—whether
simple error, negligence or other--are no longer
important. An "indication" may be proven,
moreover, by inferences and implications which
need not meet the test for a "misrepresentation."
...The changed conditions clause eliminates the
factual elements of misrepresentation and any need
to impose a burden on plaintiff to prove those
elements . 27
Because it offers advantages to both owners and
contractors, the DSC clause has been heralded as an
important advance in construction contracting. But despite
its advantages and the quickness with which it was accepted
by the industry, the DSC clause has not eliminated changed
conditions disputes.
Type I Disputes
To recover for a Type I condition, a contractor must
show that what was encountered differed materially from what
the contract indicated. Type I claims usually deal with the
subsurface soil condition. Consequently, the most common
Type I dispute is over what the contract "indicates" the
subsurface condition to be like.
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The court must form its own opinion of what the
contract indicates. "The most reliable and most specific
indicator" 28 of the subsurface condition is the soil
borings. Court decisions on DSC clause disputes inevitably
turn on the court's interpretation of the borings.
In Ragonese v. United States (120 F.Supp. 768), the
contractor was impacted by an extensive amount of water
entering his sewer pipe trenches. Although the contract
contained soil borings, none of the borings showed that
water was encountered during drilling. Ragonese bid the job
as if groundwater would not be encountered. When
groundwater impacted the excavation, Ragonese sought an
equitable adjustment to its contract under the differing
site conditions clause. Ragonese claimed that by not
showing the presence of water in the borings, the government
had represented that groundwater intrusion would not be a
problem during construction, and the presence of
groundwater, therefore, constituted a Type I differing site
condition. The court rejected Ragonese' s contention:
The plans and specifications set out the character
of the soil disclosed by these borings, but said
nothing one way or the other about subsurface
water. It, therefore, cannot be said that the
contractor encountered subsurface or latent
conditions materially differing from those




To recover for a Type I differing site condition, a
contractor must first show that there was an indication in
the contract from which the actual condition differed. If a
contract is silent as to any aspect of the existing site
conditions, there can be nothing shown on the drawings or
indicated in the specifications from which the actual
conditions can materially differ.
This legal theory is sound and has been upheld in many
subsequent decisions, but the Ragonese court's reasoning
with regard to the specific dispute may now be obsolete. In
a later case, Woodcrest v. United States (408 F.2d 406), the
court ruled that the absence of a groundwater indication
from the borings did indicate that groundwater would not be
encountered.
The job was for renovations to a building on a Air
Force base. The contract contained soil borings, but the
borings showed no groundwater. Woodcrest encountered
groundwater in his excavations and was forced to perform
extensive dewatering. He sued to recover the additional
costs, claiming that this was a Type I DSC. The government
argued that this situation could not be considered a Type I
DSC since there was no groundwater indication in the
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contract from which the actual condition could differ. The
court ruled in favor of Woodcrest
:
Although no actual representation was made by the
Government that there was no ground water, and
thus, we cannot say that there was a warranty, the
effect upon the contractor of furnishing core
boring logs without indicating the ground water
shown by such borings may be the same as if a
representation had been made. ...The logs
furnished the bidder showed no subsurface water,
and a contractor's assumption that therefore there
was no subsurface water is only one step removed
from an actual representation by the Government to
that effect. ...There was in effect a description
of the site, upon which plaintiff had a right to
rely, and by which it was misled. 30
This court's ruling probably reflects more modern
practices of geotechnical engineering. By not indicating
groundwater in the borings, the engineer is making an
affirmative indication that groundwater was not encountered.
The Woodcrest ruling may also reflect a more current
judicial attitude toward finding an affirmative indication
in the contract. Modern courts do not want to rule against
a contractor simply because an affirmative indication can't
be found. United Contractors v. United States (368 F.2d
585) illustrates this point.
This contract was for the installation of underground
utility vaults (utilidors) on an Air Force base. During
construction, United was impacted by groundwater in his
trenches. The court agreed that the plans given to United
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said nothing about water, but found, in other documents
given bidders outside the contract, an affirmative
indication that ground water did not exist.
The court looked at several sheets of drawings given to
bidders that showed existing utilidors on the base. These
drawings clearly indicated that the work shown was not a
part of United' s contract, but they included borings
relevant to the construction of the existing utilidors.
Although most of these borings showed no groundwater
encountered, "a couple indicated water at depths to which
United had to dig." On this basis, the court concluded:
United could reasonably look at all the borings
furnished by the Government, including those
outside its particular project; and the import of
the borings was that undue amounts of water would
not be met in excavation. 31
The court ruled that the presence of groundwater in
United' s utilidor trenches did constitute a Type I differing
site condition despite the absence of groundwater
information from the borings relevant to his work, despite a
statement in the specifications cautioning that "a condition
of high ground water exists in this [work] area, " and
despite the fact that ponds and water ditches were shown in
the drawings. Addressing these last two conditions of the
contract, the court said:
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These two warnings, vaguely suggesting the
presence of water, were not adequate to impel
plaintiff to anticipate the particular difficulty
it had. Their low-key message was muffled by the
specific information on subsurface water furnished
by the profile drawings. ...The significance of
the high ground water warning is not enlarged upon
in the evidence. ...To us it appears to be an
indefinite caveat without precise content. 32
Based on Ragonese, if a contract is truly silent on
what will be encountered, a Type I differing site condition
will not be recognized. But as shown in United Contractors,
courts will look carefully at the entire contract (not just
the borings) and any other information that may have been
provided before concluding that the contract is silent as to
any aspect of the existing conditions.
The practice of looking beyond the borings to the
intent of the contract as a whole can work to the owner's
advantage as well. In Morrison-Knudsen v. United States
(345 F.2d 535) the contractor encountered permafrost in two
excavations where the soil borings showed none existed. The
permafrost had to be blasted to be removed. The contractor
sued for the additional costs.
The court noted the encounter of permafrost at two
locations where the borings showed none, but went on to look
at the other borings in the contract. Of the thirteen
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borings contained in the plans, seven showed permafrost.
The court concluded:
These data furnished by the defendant to the
plaintiff in connection with the bid papers were
clearly sufficient to indicate to a reasonably
prudent bidder that permafrost was widespread in
the area... and might well be encountered in
performing the excavation work at the two
sites, even though the information which the
defendant furnished as to holes 260 and 261
incorrectly showed an absence of permafrost at the
particular points where those holes were
drilled. 33
Based on other evidence, the court determined that soil
borings with regard to permafrost were accurate only within
a 10-foot radius of the hole. The court awarded the
contractor only the cost of blasting the permafrost
encountered within a 10-foot radius of each of the two
misleading borings.
In Morrison-Knudsen, the court applied a test of
"prudence" to its interpretation of the information in the
contract. The court asked itself: How would a reasonably
prudent contractor interpret the information in the
contract? Here, the court determined that such a contractor
would have known that he would encounter permafrost
throughout the site based on the information in the




In Leal v. United States (276 F.2d 378), the contractor
was not allowed to recover because the court determined that
his interpretation of the information contained in the
contract was not prudent. The contract was for the
construction of a diversion channel and dam embankment on
the Caney River in northeast Oklahoma. The contract
contained 35 soil borings. Eleven of them showed the
letters "WT" at approximately elevation 689. There was no
indication in the contract of the meaning of the letters
"WT . "
During construction, Leal encountered groundwater at a
depth of 690 feet. Leal, contending that there was no
indication in the contract that groundwater would be
encountered, sued to recover his additional costs pursuant
to the differing site conditions clause.
The government argued that the letters "WT" indicated
"water table, " that this abbreviation is common in soil
boring logs, and that a reasonably prudent contractor would
understand it as such. The court agreed with the
government
.
The facts. . .cause us to conclude that [Leal]
simply miscalculated and did not heed the warning
signs in the specifications and drawings
furnished, which information was sufficient to
inform an experienced contractor that water would
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be encountered. Therefore, it cannot be said that
he encountered changed conditions which were
compensable . . . 34
Of course, Type I differing site conditions do not have
to involve the subsoil. The case of P. J. Maffei Bldg.
Wrecking v. United States (732 F.2d 913) illustrates this
point. Here, the contract was for the demolition and
removal of a government-owned pavilion. The building had a
structural steel frame, but the contract gave no indication
of the amount of steel in the building.
The contract stated that all demolished steel would
become the property of the contractor and that bidders
should reduce their bids by their estimates of the salvage
value of the steel. The quantity of salvageable steel was
to be based on visual information obtained from a site
visit
.
The Invitation for Bids (IFB) stated that as-built
drawings of the existing structure might be obtained from
the New York Department of Parks, but they also stated
explicitly that the Parks Department drawings were not a
part of the contract.
Maffei examined the as-built drawings in the offices of
the Parks Department and based his estimate of the salvage
value of the steel on those drawings. However, Maffei
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recovered 20% less steel than estimated, and so sued to
recoup the value of the steel not recovered. Maffei claimed
that the shortage of steel constituted a Type I differing
site condition.
The government argued that the Parks Department
drawings were explicitly excluded from Maffei' s contract,
and that Maffei was not justified in relying on them. The
court agreed with the government
:
In this case, we cannot accept the view that the
Government's reference, in the IFB to structural
drawings available from the New York City Parks
Department amounted to an "indication,
"
representation, or undertaking by the Government
that the dimensions of the steel in the Pavilion
were accurately or reliably depicted by the
drawings. While it is true that a contract
"indication" need not be explicit or specific, the
contract documents must still provide sufficient
grounds to justify a bidder's expectation of
latent conditions materially different from those
actually encountered. ...IFB provision 1.2 can be
interpreted only as an effort by the Government to
direct prospective contractors to information
which might prove helpful in formulating their
bids, but not as proffering any specific
information bearing directly on the steel
conditions to be found. 35
The court found no indication in the contract of the
amount of steel to be recovered. The reference to the Parks
Department drawings did not constitute an indication in the
contract of the amount of steel to be recovered, since these
drawings were explicitly excluded from the contract.
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Because the contract contained no indication of the amount
of steel to be recovered, Maffei could not claim that the
amount of steel recovered differed materially from an
indication in the contract.
Type II Disputes
For a contractor to recover for a Type II condition, he
must show that he encountered "unknown conditions of an
unusual nature differing materially from those ordinarily
encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of
the character provided for in the contract." The following
cases illustrate Type II conditions.
In Western Well Drilling v. United States (96 F.Supp.
377) , the court clarified the intent of the DSC clause with
respect to a Type II differing site condition:
The term "unusual" does not refer to a geological
freak but rather a condition which would not be
anticipated by the parties to the contract in
entering into their initial agreement.
In general, if a court discovers that neither side in
the dispute expected to encounter the conditions that were
encountered, the court will likely find that a Type II
differing site condition existed.
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The contractor in Loftis v. United States (76 F . Supp
.
816) was successful in convincing a court that he had
encountered a Type II condition. The contract was for the
extension of runways at a military airfield. There were
no soil borings included in the contract, but the contract
did require bidders to visit the site prior to submitting a
bid.
Loftis visited the site, made a thorough investigation,
and concluded that there were no unusual conditions that
would impact the cost of the work.
During construction, Loftis encountered unstable
subsurface conditions on a portion of the site that required
extensive excavation and fill. During the fill operation,
water migrated to the surface, and eventually, the area
would not support Loftis' earth moving and compaction
equipment. The government required that the entire area be
mucked out and replaced with acceptable fill. Loftis
complied with the government's order, but by the time the
work was completed, Loftis had handled 24 times more fill
material than he had anticipated.
Loftis sued to recover his additional costs claiming
that the unstable subsurface conditions could not have been
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anticipated from the information in the contract or from a
site visit
.
The court agreed that this was a Type II differing site
condition. The court relied on the fact that Loft is was an
experienced contractor, and that his engineer, who made the
site visit and concluded that unusual conditions would not
be encountered, had 22 years of experience in heavy
construction. The court found that the engineer's
conclusion that no unusual conditions would be encountered
was reasonable:
The investigations made by plaintiff were as
thorough and complete as was possible under the
circumstances, and the conclusions reached by
plaintiff are shown by the facts established by
the record to have been justified and entirely
reasonable from the standpoint of good engineering
practice and proper construction procedure in
connection with embankment fill construction. 36
To convince a court that he encountered a Type II
condition, a contractor must show:
1
.
That he did everything he could reasonably be
expected to do to ascertain the nature of the
existing site conditions. This includes making a
site visit and reviewing all information included
with or referred to in the contract.
2. That he concluded from all the information made
available that unusual conditions would not be
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encountered, and that this conclusion was prudently
reached by experienced and competent people.
3. That he based his bid on these conclusions.
4. That he encountered conditions that he did not
anticipate in his bid.
5. That he was damaged by the actual conditions
encountered
.
In Phillips v. United States (394 F.2d 834) the court
ruled that an inadequate design of a storm drainage system
constituted a Type II differing site condition. The
contract was for a multi-unit housing project at an Air
Force base. During construction, Phillips encountered some
of the heaviest rainfall ever recorded in the area. The
rain turned the site into a quagmire, caused Phillips' work
to be delayed, and increased the cost of performance.
Phillips acknowledged that the contract assigned the
risk of delays caused by weather to him, but he claimed that
the site problems caused by the weather were compounded by
an inadequate storm drainage system that was designed by the
government
.
Witnesses for both sides agreed that large areas of the
site became flooded when it rained and remained that way for
long periods after the rain stopped. In reviewing the
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drawings, the ASBCA concluded that "there was nothing to put
a bidder on notice that drainage of the area might become a
major problem or that the specified drainage system might
prove to be inadequate." 37
The government argued that the site inspection clause
required bidders to become familiar with the existing
conditions, so Phillips was not entitled to recover for the
unusual site drainage conditions. The ASBCA rejected this
argument saying:
The evidence is clear that nine people visited the
site who gave information to the appellant before
its bid was submitted. The soil had good bearing
qualities. Two places were wet but the reports
were that they could be drained effectively. The
Board considers that the appellant could rely on
the implied warranty that the drainage prescribed
by the Government would be effective. ...The Board
has no difficulty in determining that the drainage
system prescribed in the drawings was inadequate
during the construction period causing large areas
of the site... to be flooded numerous times during
rains and causing the flooded ground to be
saturated for prolonged periods. The fact that
about half the site would be flood area was an
unknown physical condition on the site. 38
Here, as in the Loftis case, the board looked at all
the information available to the contractor at bid time and
applied the test of "prudence." From the testimony of
witnesses on both sides, and from its own review of the
plans and specifications, the board determined that a
prudent bidder could not have anticipated the drainage
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problems that were encountered. Consequently, the court
ruled that this was a Type II condition, and Phillips was
allowed to recover his additional costs.
Exculpatory Language
Owners often rely on exculpatory language to avoid
liability for the accuracy of the site information they
provide in their contracts. If the contract contains a DSC
clause, exculpatory language is rarely successful. In
general, the courts regard exculpatory language as
contradictory to the intent of the differing site conditions
clause
.
Exculpatory Language Not Allowed to Prevail
The case of Foster Construction C.A. and Williams
Brothers Company v. United States, (435 F.2d 873) is
instructional. This contract was for the construction of a
bridge in a remote part of Central America. The contract
contained soil borings but also included an exculpatory note
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which read: "Drill Hole Data shown for information only.
The Bureau of Public Roads does not assume responsibility
for the accuracy of the data."
Foster encountered substantially different subsurface
material than the borings indicated which increased the cost
of performing the work. He sued the government to recover
his additional costs pursuant to the differing site
conditions clause. The government relied on the exculpatory
language as its defense, but the court would not allow the
exculpatory language to prevail:
Even unmistakable contract language in which the
Government seeks to disclaim responsibility for
drill hole data does not lessen the right of
reliance. The decisions reject, as in conflict
with the changed conditions clause, a "standard
mandatory clause of broad application," the
variety of such disclaimers of responsibility--
that the logs are not guaranteed, not
representations, that the bidder is urged to draw
his own conclusions. ...Particular protection is
given by the courts to the right of bidders to
rely upon drill hole data in the contract,
recognized to be the most reliable and the most
specific indicator of subsurface conditions. 39
This decision is in marked contrast to the Elkan v.
Sebastian Bridge case discussed earlier. Under similar
conditions Elkan could not recover his additional costs when
the subsurface material encountered was different from what
the borings showed. The distinction between the two cases
is the existence of the DSC clause. In Elkan, the court
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ruled that the only obligation the government had with
respect to the borings was to not misrepresent the facts.
The courts recognize that the intent of a DSC clause is
to induce lower bids by promising to pay for additional
construction costs incurred as a result of encountering
unforeseen site conditions. To protect the intent of the
DSC clause, the courts will allow it to prevail over broadly
worded exculpatory language.
The court, in Loftis v. United States (cited earlier),
addressed the issue of exculpatory language. The government
argued that Loftis was not entitled to an equitable
adjustment because of exculpatory language that required all
excavation to be performed at the original contract price
"even if the subsurface conditions encountered were unknown
and unforeseeable." The court found little merit in this
argument
:
This argument of defendant might be justified if
we could ignore the fact that the contract, and of
necessity the specifications, also contained
Article 4 (the DSC clause) . The purpose of
specifications and drawings is to supplement the
formal contract by delineating the details of the
work to be performed there under and not to void
an express provision written into the contract. 40
Again in United Contractors v. United States (cited
earlier) , the government relied on the exculpatory language
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in the contract as its defense. However, the decision was
not influenced by the exculpatory language:
Broad exculpatory clauses cannot be given their
full literal reach, and do not relieve the
defendant of liability for changed conditions as
the broad language thereof would seem to indicate.
. . .General portions of the specifications should
not lightly be read to override the Changed
Conditions clause. It takes clear and unambiguous
language to do that, for the provision sought to
be eliminated, or subordinated, is a standard
mandatory clause of broad application. 41
The court here makes a distinction between broadly and
narrowly worded exculpatory language. Consistent with
Foster Construction, the court did not allow the broadly
worded exculpatory clause to prevail over the differing site
conditions clause, but the court went on to imply that
"clear and unambiguous language" may be allowed to prevail
over the DSC clause.
Exculpatory Language Allowed to Prevail
The Engineering Board of Contract Appeals ruled in the
case of James McHugh Construction Company (ENG BCA No. 4 600,
82-1 BCA para. 15,682) that the exculpatory language used in
the contract was sufficiently narrow and unambiguous.
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The contract was for the construction of subway tunnels
for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA)
. The contract showed that the majority of the
tunneling was to be through solid rock. Pre-bid soil
reports from WMATA' s designer and post-bid reports from
WMATA' s contract administrator all indicated to McHugh that
the compressive strength of the rock, in which the tunnels
were to be built, varied from 3,000 to 12,000 psi. McHugh
relied on this information in sizing a tunnel boring machine
and estimated that the boring machine could achieve a
productivity rate of five feet per hour.
During construction, McHugh achieved a significantly
lower rate of production with the machine. The lower
productivity increased the cost of performance. Upon
completion of the operation, McHugh conducted his own tests
of the compressive strength of the rock and found that the
average compressive strength was approximately twice that
indicated in WMATA' s pre- and post-bid soils reports.
McHugh appealed to the Engineering Board of Contract Appeals
to recover his additional expenses.
As a quasi-federal agency, WMATA used the standard
federal DSC clause in the contract but modified the clause
by adding the following paragraph:
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(d) The provisions of this article shall not
apply to the rock conditions encountered during
the construction of this project. The provisions
set forth in Special Provisions Article 2.11.2
"Data Relating to Rock Conditions" shall be
applicable thereto. 42
The relevant portion of the Special Provisions article
entitled "Data Relating to Rock Conditions" read:
(c) The provisions of Article 1.4, Differing Site
Conditions, shall not apply to the rock
encountered during construction of this project,
including rock reinforcement and direct rock
support, as herein set forth and specified
elsewhere in the Technical Provisions. 43
WMATA relied on this exculpatory language in denying
liability for any additional costs incurred as a result of
the character of the rock. WMATA claimed that its
exculpatory language was sufficiently narrow (it addressed
only rock) and unambiguous (it left no doubt that rock was
being omitted from coverage under the DSC clause) to be
enforceable. The Board agreed:
Respondent [WMATA] drew up and offered to the
bidding community a contract containing a
conspicuous, material deviation from the standard
federal form of construction contract. It is
difficult to imagine how Respondent could more
emphatically have disavowed any intention to
relieve its future contractor of the risk of
differing rock conditions. The exclusionary
language is clearly set forth in the very clause
[DSC clause] on which Appellant [McHugh] bases its
claim of entitlement. ...It is obvious that WMATA,
in planning the project, resolved to break away
from federal precedent and make it unmistakably
clear that the contractor rather than the owner
must bear the risk of adverse subsurface rock

conditions. ...Here, there is no ambiguity or
conflict; the disclaimer appears in both the DSC
clause and the special provision. . . .McHugh
entered into the contract freely and voluntarily.
When it did so, it accepted the rigorous
conditions established by the contract documents.
It thereby assumed a contingency of unpredictable
proportions-one that WMATA itself was unwilling to
risk. 44
It is important to note that this is a BCA decision and
not a court's ruling. A court case dealing with a similar
situation could not be found. In essence, though, the Board
confirmed the ruling in United Contractors that unambiguous
and narrowly defined exculpatory language will be allowed to
prevail over a differing site conditions clause.
Other Factors Affecting Exculpatory Language
In determining if exculpatory language should be
enforced, courts have also looked at the length of time
available to bidders to conduct their own subsurface
investigations prior to submitting bids. The case of Al
Johnson Construction Company v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Company, (426 F.Supp. 639) addressed this issue.
The contract was for the construction of a bridge





The contract contained a DSC clause and
included borings taken from the river bed. The contract
also contained the following language:
No representations or guarantees are made
concerning the completeness of the boring data.
Such data indicates an opinion as to materials
encountered at the specification location of the
respective borings and may not represent materials
which will actually be encountered in performing
the work. 45
During construction, Johnson encountered a rock ledge
that was not shown in the borings. The ledge required a
different and more costly method of cofferdam construction
than was originally anticipated. Johnson claimed that the
ledge constituted a differing site condition and sued to
recover his additional costs. MOPAC relied on the
exculpatory language.
During the trial, the court became convinced that MOPAC
expected bidders to rely on the subsurface information
provided in the contract. The court pointed to the short
time (1 month) allowed for bid preparation as evidence that
bidders were expected to rely on the information provided:
In view of the abnormal height of the river during
the time of bidding and the relatively short time
MOPAC allowed for the preparation of bids, it did
not expect any of the bidders would make their own
borings and subsurface survey.
It would have been virtually impossible for any
bidder to make its own borings, analyze them,
compute, prepare, and submit its bid in the time
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allowed. Under such circumstances, the
disclaimers could only be binding against the
Contractor on variations in conditions that were
of a minor or non-substantial nature and which a
contractor could reasonably have been expected to
foresee and allow for in the preparation of its
bid. 46
If a court is convinced that an owner intended for
bidders to rely on subsurface information presented in the
contract, exculpatory language will not be enforced. A
short period of time allowed to prepare bids indicates to
most courts that the owner intended for bidders to rely on
the subsurface information he provided.
Site Visitation Clauses
A form of exculpatory language relied on by owners to
defend against contract price increases is the site
visitation clause. A typical site visitation clause
requires bidders to visit the site and become familiar with
the local conditions prior to submitting a bid. In
differing site conditions disputes, the courts treat this
clause as they do exculpatory language. They will not allow
broadly worded site visitation clauses to nullify the intent
of the DSC clause.
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The court, in Foster Construction, addressed the issue
of site visitation and the government's policy of including
a DSC in its construction contracts:
Faithful execution of the policy requires that the
promise in the changed conditions clause not be
frustrated by an expansive concept of the duty of
bidders to investigate the site. That duty, if
not carefully limited, could force bidders to rely
on their own investigations, lessen their reliance
on logs in the contract and reintroduce the
practice sought to be eradicated—the computation
of bids on the basis of the bidders' own
investigations, with contingency elements often
substituting for investigation. ...Clause 2 [the
site visitation clause] requires bidders only to
ascertain such conditions as may be readily
determined by inspection and inquiry, such as the
location, accessibility and general character of
the site. ...In the cases arising under the modern
changed conditions clause, caution continues to be
observed that the duty to make an inspection of
the site does not negate the changed conditions
clause by putting the contractor at peril to
discover hidden subsurface conditions or those
beyond the limits of an inspection appropriate to
the time available. ...The contractor is unable to
rely on contract indications of the subsurface
only where relatively simple inquiries might have
revealed contrary conditions. 47
There have been instances, however, when a contractor
has been denied recovery on the basis of a site visitation
clause. The case of Walsh Bros. v. United States, (69
F.Supp. 129), is an example. Here, the contract was for the
construction of several temporary army barracks on bases in
Maine and Massachusetts. Walsh encountered old foundations
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below ground while excavating. The foundations required
special machinery and additional labor to remove.
Since there was no reference to the foundations in the
contract, Walsh claimed that they were a latent and unknown
physical condition of the site, and as such, constituted a
differing site condition. Walsh sued for his additional
costs
.
The government argued that the foundations were not a
latent condition since parts of them were visible at the
surface and would have put a prudent site visitor on notice
of what would be encountered underground. The contract
required bidders to make a site visit prior to submitting a
bid, but, the government pointed out, Walsh never visited
the site.
In view of these facts, Walsh was not allowed to
recover. The site visitation clause will prevail only in
instances where the condition giving rise to the dispute is
readily observable from a site visit regardless of whether
or not the condition is identified in the contract itself.

Proof of Damages
As in misrepresentation cases, once the technical
aspects of the case are proved, the contractor still has the
burden of proving damages. The contractor must show first
that he was damaged by the differing site condition, and
then be able to show, with reasonable certainty, the extent
to which he was damaged. A thorough discussion of proof of
damages is outside the scope of this paper, but a lot of
legal literature addresses the subject.
Summary
A differing site conditions clause provides access
through the contract to recover additional costs resulting
from encountering the unknown. In general, courts have
found that the clause is intended to compensate a contractor
for encountering conditions that neither the contractor nor
the owner anticipated would be encountered.
To recover for a Type I condition a contractor must
show that the conditions encountered differed from the
conditions indicated in the contract and that this
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difference caused him damage. The courts have found that
the soil borings are the most specific representation in the
contract of the subsurface condition, but they will look at
other parts of the contract before making a determination of
what was indicated in the contract.
Recovery for a Type II condition requires evidence that
the condition encountered could not have been anticipated.
The courts usually apply the test of "prudence" to Type II
disputes. A court will ask: What would a reasonably prudent
contractor have assumed the existing condition to be like?
If a reasonably prudent contractor would not have
anticipated the condition encountered, the contractor will
usually be allowed to recover. The experience and
competence of the people in the contractor's organization
that reach the conclusion that unusual conditions would not
be encountered is the single most important determination
made by the court in a Type II DSC decision.
Exculpatory language generally will not prevail over a
differing site conditions clause. The courts recognize that
the intent of a DSC clause is to induce lower bids by
promising to pay for the unknown if it is encountered. The
courts are reluctant to allow exculpatory language to
nullify the intent of the differing site conditions clause
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after the owner has benefitted from lower bid prices. Only
exculpatory language that is unambiguous and which
specifically addresses the situation in dispute will be
allowed to prevail over a differing site conditions clause.
Synopses of DSC Claims
Figures 3 and 4 are flowcharts that can be used to
quickly gauge the potential success of a claim pursued via a
differing site conditions clause. Below are synopses of
claims pursued via a differing site conditions clause. The
issues addressed will help create a better understanding of
the situations under which a court will allow recovery.
* * *
In Kaiser Industries v. United States (340 F.2nd 322),
the government provided a quarry from which Kaiser was to
procure construction materials. The quarry did not provide
a sufficient quantity of material to complete the job. The
government provided a second quarry which lasted until the
end of the job. Kaiser claimed that he incurred additional
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Figure 3: Type I Differing Site Conditions Flowchart
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Figure 4: Type II Differing Site Conditions Flowchart

costs looking for materials in the first quarry that didn't
exist. The court ruled that this was a Type I condition and
awarded Kaiser the additional costs.
* * *
In Blauner Construction v. United States (94 Ct.Cl.
503) the government dug four test pits on the project site
and required bidders to visit the site and make their own
judgments of the subsurface conditions. The pits showed
granite and irregular elevations within the site. Blauner
did not visit the site but based his bid on the borings
included in the plans that were made from the pits. Blauner
encountered granite in several excavations at higher
elevations than the pits and borings showed. The court
ruled in favor of the government since the borings and pits
both showed no definite elevation at which granite would be
encountered.
* **
With similar facts, the court, in John K. Ruff v.
United States (96 Ct.Cl. 148), reached a different
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conclusion. Here, only one pit was dug. It showed the
presence of only sand and clay. The borings included in the
contract stated that the nearest rock outcrop was two blocks
west of the project site. The contractor encountered rock
in his excavations. The court concluded that the purpose of
the pit and borings was to impress upon bidders that rock
would not be encountered. The court found in favor of Ruff.
In the case of Arundel Corporation v. United States
(515 F.2nd 1116), the contractor claimed that it encountered
substantially more rock in his dredging operations than the
borings indicated. Arundel hired a local geologist to
perform his own borings who claimed that the site actually
contained more than 28% rock where the borings showed only
10% rock would be found. After reviewing the reports of
both the contractor's and the government's geologists, the
court concluded that the difference between the estimates of
the amount of rock to be encountered was not material. The
contractor's geologist included soft, medium, hard and very
hard rock in its definition of rock, while the government's
definition included only medium, hard and very hard rock.

90
Because the difference was one of nomenclature and not
materiality, Arundel could not recover.
** *
In the case of Meltzer v. United States (77 F . Supp
.
1018), the contractor's cofferdam collapsed because it
rested on cemented sand and gravel conglomerate. The court
ruled that this was a Type I DSC since only 2 of the 25
borings included in the contract showed the presence of
conglomerate
.
The contractor, in Fehlhaber v. United States (151
F.Supp. 817), had to exert much greater time and effort
driving piles to the specified distance below grade than the
contract led him to believe. The government ultimately
revised the specifications and allowed the piles to be
driven to shallower depths because of the subsurface
condition encountered. Fehlhaber claimed this was a Type I
DSC. The government relied on the exculpatory language in
the contract to deny liability. The court would not allow
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the exculpatory clause to prevail and awarded Fehlhaber his
additional costs.
* * *
In Moorhead Construction v. City of Grand Forks (508
F.2nd 1008), the contract was for the second phase of
construction on a sewage treatment plant. Moorhead expected
earth embankments to be 90% compacted by the phase I
contractor. They were not, and Moorhead incurred additional
expenses. The court agreed that this situation was covered
by the DSC clause and awarded Moorhead his additional costs.
The contract, in the case of A. D. and G. D. Fox v.
United States (7 Cl.Ct. 60), was for the construction of a
road. The contract contained no soil borings but did give a
compaction factor for the existing soil. Fox did not seek
further subsurface information from the owner but made
assumptions about the existing conditions based on the
compaction factor. When Fox encountered more rock than he
anticipated, he sued to recover the added costs. The court
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ruled that Fox could not make assumptions about the existing
soil based on the compaction factor and would not allow Fox
to recover.
***
In Appeal of Yadkin, Inc. (PSBCA No. 2051), the
»
contract for construction of a post office facility stated
that 5,676 cy of top soil had to be removed and replaced.
Yadkin actually removed 7,079 cy. Trial testimony
established that a prudent contractor would anticipate as
much as a 10% overrun of the quantity stated in the contract
when bidding this type of work. The court accepted this
testimony and awarded Yadkin the additional costs for only
the quantity excavated over 110% of the quantity stated in
the contract.
***
In Weeks Dredging and Contracting v. United States (13
Cl.Ct. 193), the contract was for dredging 30 miles of river
channel. Although he made a pre-bid site visit, Weeks did
not travel the length of the channel to inspect the exposed
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river bank. The site visit concentrated on the logistical
aspect of getting equipment to the work. Weeks derived the
quantities of sand, silt, and gravel he would encounter
exclusively from the 156 soil borings provided in the plans.
When he encountered a larger percentage of gravel than
expected, Weeks incurred higher costs and sued to recover.
The court noted that the 156 borings included in the
contract were taken randomly over a 30 mile stretch of
river. The court concluded that it was unreasonable for
Weeks to estimate soil quantities from this information and
hinted that Weeks' cost overrun was the result of an




In Appeal of Kasler Corporation (ASBCA No. 30047), the
contract was for cleaning existing fuel tanks. The size of
the tanks was not explicitly stated in the bid documents,
but the tanks were identified with "designators" that led
experienced contractors to believe that they were 8500
gallon tanks. Kasler sought clarification prior to bid
opening but got no response from the government. After
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award, Kasler discovered that the tanks had a 31,000 gallon
capacity. Kasler claimed this was a differing site
condition. The government denied liability claiming that
the capacity of the tanks could have been determined from a
site visit. The board ruled that the tank "designators"
used in the bid documents constituted a positive
representation of the capacity of the tanks and would not
allow the site visitation clause to prevail over the
positive representation. Kasler recovered.
In Appeal of Bowie & K Enterprises (IBCA No. 1788), the
contract was for the renovation of buildings for the
National Park Service. The drawings stated that the
building dimensions shown were approximate. After award,
B&K sued for additional costs it incurred as a result of
incorrect building dimensions in the plans. The board ruled
that a diligent site investigation would have given B&K the
correct information. The board relied on the site




The contract, in J. E. Robertson v. United States (437
F.2nd 1360), was for renovations to existing utilities in an
Air Force building. Part of the work involved the removal
of a concrete floor. A detail in the contract showed an
existing drain in the floor connected to an existing drain
line by a six inch nipple. The contract clearly identified
the nipple as being 6 inches long. Robertson made a site
visit and measured the thickness of the floor at a hole to
be 6 inches. Based on the detail and his own measurements,
Robertson based his bid on a six inch thick floor. The
floor turned out to be up to 24 inches thick. Robertson
sued claiming this was a Type I DSC. The government argued
that there was no positive representation in the contract of
the floor's thickness from which the actual condition could
vary. The court agreed with Robertson. The combination of
the detail and the site visit was sufficient to constitute a





Claims pursued under a misrepresentation theory are
complex and require a contractor to show some fault on the
part of the owner before recovery is allowed. To recover on
a DSC claim, a contractor need only show that what was
encountered differed from what was reasonably expected.
Misrepresentation Claims
Factors relevant to recovery under the theory of
misrepresentation are:
1. The owner has a duty to reveal to bidders all
information in his possession that is relevant to
estimating the cost of the work. This obligation
extends to information in the owner's possession

97
that qualifies information presented in the
contract
.
2. The owner need not make all relevant information a
part of the contract. Relevant information may be
provided outside the contract simply for review.
3. An owner's concealment of information need not be
"sinister" for a contractor to recover.
4. Bidders have an obligation to obtain, review, and
make prudent judgments on all information that is
readily accessible.
5. Bidders are allowed to rely on all information
presented in the contract as a fact
.
6. Exculpatory language can be used to disclaim
liability for otherwise factual information.
DSC Claims
Factors relevant to recovery on a claim pursued under a
DSC clause are:
1. If a contract is truly silent regarding an existing
condition, a Type I DSC can not be recognized.
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2. The entire contract (including information provided
gratuitously) must be considered in determining
what the contract "indicates."
3. Competent and experienced people must make the
determination that unexpected conditions won't be
encountered for a Type II condition to be
recognized.
4. Warnings about conditions must be clear,
unequivocal and focused on the specific situation
in order to be enforced.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of the cases
discussed in this paper. They show a fairly consistent
distribution: 24 cases were decided in favor of the owner
and 23 in favor of the contractor. The results indicate,
however, that a contractor has a much better chance of
recovery if his dispute is pursued through a DSC clause.
This is probably due to the lighter burden of proof required




SUMMARY OF MISREPRESENTATION CASES
Prevailing Party
Litigant Owner

























































SUMMARY OF DSC CLAUSE CASES
Prevailing Party
Litigant Owner Contractor Reason
Arundel X Contractor i
B&K Enterprises X Contractor i
Blauner X Contractor i
Fehlhaber X Type I
Foster-Williams X Type I
Fox X Contractor i
Johnson X Type I
Kaiser X Type I
Kasler X Type I
Leal X Contractor i
Loftis X Type II
Maffei X Contractor ]
McHugh X Contractor i
Meltzer X Type II
Moorhead X Type I
Phillips X Type I
I
Ragonese X Type I
Robertson X Type I
Ruff X Type I
United X Type I
Walsh Bros. X Contractor ]
Weeks X Contractor i
Western Well X Type I
Woodcrest X Type I
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c.l An investigation of the
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differing site conditions
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